8010 Dumps With Exact Questions and Answers

According to ISDA standard definitions, the legal claim for OTCderivatives is the current replacement value of the contract. Therefore Choice 'c' is the correct answer. None of the other choices are correct.

The exposure at default is the greatest for the certificate of deposit as the entire notional amount is exposed to the risk of default. The other choices represent derivatives for which the current replacement value, which would be far less than notional, would be the credit exposure.

Said another way - if the counterparty were to default, the entire money in the CD would be at risk, whereas for the derivative contracts it would only be the replacement value that would be at risk.

Counterparty risk was difficult to gauge as it was impossible to know who the counterparty's counterparties were - this is true as the chain of financial transactions became excessively long with no central transparency of who owed who what. Bank A's credit depended upon the health of its counterparties, whose health in turn depended upon other counterparties. Thus Choice 'd' is a correct statement.

In an attempt to diversify, banks became more like each other - chasing yield, they piled into securitized products, and chasing diversification, they piled into different types of securitized products. The system as a whole became susceptible to small shocks in the assets underlying this vast edifice of structured products. Therefore Choice 'a' represents a correct statement.

Choice 'c' does not represent a correct statement. Central banks had little data on the interconnections between institutions. They were aware of the large volumes of OTC transactions, but had no data to figure out who was connected to who, and who had what kind of exposures.

Choice 'b' represents a correct statement. Most transactions, other than exchange cleared futures trades (which were atiny fraction of all trades) were cleared on a bilateral basis. The existence of central counterparties (CCPs) could have limited the impact of the crisis significantly as market participants would not have lost trust in each other, and the 'collateral damage' that was witnessed from a fall in housing prices, and thereby mortgage assets, would have been more contained.