The correct field is FilePath because the investigation is focused on events executing from a specific directory on the host. In Falcon Event Search, path-based filtering is used when a responder wants to identify activity tied to a folder location such as a user profile, temp directory, startup folder, or suspicious staging path. TreeId is related to process lineage and is not the right field for directory matching. @source identifies the data source or index-related context, not the executable location. ParentBaseFileName is useful when searching for child processes launched by a specific parent executable, but it does not identify where the executing file resides. FilePath directly maps to the file location, making it the correct field for directory-based event hunting.

Domain name-based IOCs in Falcon are used for detection-oriented visibility, not endpoint prevention in the same way as file-hash indicators. File hashes can support blocking or allowing because the sensor can evaluate executable content directly. Domains are network indicators, so the practical actions available are limited to detection or no enforcement action. “Detect only” creates visibility when matching activity is observed, while “No action” allows the indicator to be stored or staged without triggering enforcement behavior. Options that include “Block” or “Allow” are incorrect because domain-based IOCs do not work like hash allowlists or prevention hashes in Falcon IOC Management. This distinction is important for responders because choosing the wrong IOC type or expected action can lead to false assumptions about containment capability.

The fastest Falcon Platform action to stop active data exfiltration from a known endpoint is network containment. Containing Bob-Desktop from the Falcon console restricts network communication while preserving Falcon sensor connectivity for investigation and response. This is better than trying to create an IOA or IOC for a specific destination IP because the adversary may change infrastructure, use multiple destinations, or already have active sessions. Accessing the host through RTR can support follow-up investigation, but the immediate containment action should be initiated from the Falcon console. The objective is not just to detect future traffic; it is to stop current outbound communication. Network containment is the direct responder action for isolating a host involved in suspected exfiltration.