 Ensure that the Amazon CloudWatch agent is installed on all EC2 instances:

The Amazon CloudWatch agent collects and logs metrics and sends them to Amazon CloudWatch.

To install the CloudWatch agent:

Download the CloudWatch agent package.

Install the agent on your EC2 instances.

Configure the agent to collect disk space metrics.

 Create an Amazon CloudWatch alarm to monitor available disk space on all EC2 instances Add the alarm as a safety control to the Systems Manager Automation task:

Create CloudWatch alarms to monitor the available disk space and trigger notifications or actions when the disk space falls below a defined threshold.

Add the CloudWatch alarm to the Systems Manager Automation task to halt or fail the task if disk space is insufficient.

To create the alarm:

Navigate to the CloudWatch console and create a new alarm.

Set the metric to monitor (e.g., disk space utilization).

Define the threshold and notification actions.

AWS CloudWatch Events can be used to monitor events across different AWS resources, and a CloudWatch Event Rule can be created to trigger an AWS Lambda function when a deployment issue is detected in the pipeline. The Lambda function can then evaluate the issue and send a notification to the appropriate stakeholders through an Amazon SNS topic. This approach allows for real-time notifications and faster resolution times.

Step 1: Understanding Lambda Permissions and AWS Config

The custom AWS Config rule evaluates resources and invokes an AWS Lambda function when a compliance check is triggered. For AWS Config to invoke the Lambda function, it requires permission to do so.

Issue: The Lambda function fails to execute because AWS Config doesn ' t have permission to invoke it.

Action: Modify the resource-based policy of the Lambda function to grant AWS Config permission to invoke the Lambda function.

Why: Without this permission, AWS Config cannot trigger the Lambda function, which is why the evaluation fails.

Service Control Policies in AWS Organizations set the maximum permissions available to all identities within an account, including users who have administrator-level permission sets in IAM Identity Center. A Deny SCP for iam:CreateUser attached to the research team ' s account overrides the AdministratorAccess policy in the permission set and cannot be bypassed by any action within the account. This makes it the most enforceable and tamper-resistant solution. Option A attaches a deny policy to the permission set itself, which would work for sessions using that permission set, but does not prevent IAM users in the account from creating other IAM users. Option B sets a permissions boundary, which can only limit a role ' s maximum permissions, not prevent users from performing actions outside their own role ' s context. Option D is reactive, allowing IAM user creation before deletion, which is not prevention.

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When using the awslogs log driver with Amazon ECS on EC2, CloudWatch Logs permissions must be granted to the ECS container instance IAM role , not the task definition or infrastructure role. The ECS agent running on the EC2 instances is responsible for creating log streams and pushing log events to Amazon CloudWatch Logs on behalf of the containers.

In this scenario, the task definition is correctly configured to automatically create the log group (awslogs-create-group: true) and send logs to the specified Region. However, the error occurs because the EC2 container instances do not have sufficient IAM permissions to perform the required CloudWatch Logs API calls. As a result, ECS cannot place the task, and it reports that no container instance meets the requirements.

According to AWS documentation, the container instance IAM role must include the following permissions when using the awslogs driver:

logs:CreateLogStream

logs:PutLogEvents

(and, when creating log groups automatically) logs:CreateLogGroup

Option C correctly addresses the root cause by updating the container instance IAM role . Option A is incorrect because the ECS infrastructure or service role is not used to write logs. Option B is unrelated to permissions and does not resolve the issue. Option D would fail because the log group does not already exist, causing task startup to fail.

Therefore, modifying the container instance IAM role is the correct solution.

https://aws.amazon.com/quickstart/architecture/blue-green-deployment/

https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/how-to-monitor-and-visualize-failed-ssh-access-attempts-to-amazon-ec2-linux-instances/

Option A is the most correct because it provides both : (1) automated patching and (2) compliance monitoring/enforcement across a fleet, using AWS-native services built for exactly this purpose.

AWS Systems Manager Patch Manager is designed to automate patching of managed instances using patch baselines , maintenance windows (or on-demand), and it produces compliance status for patching. It’s the standard AWS service to apply OS/security patches at scale without SSH’ing into instances.

AWS Config can be used to evaluate and track compliance over time against defined rules, giving centralized visibility and continuous compliance assessment. With remediation , Config can invoke Systems Manager Automation documents to correct non-compliant resources or trigger patch actions (depending on the rule/remediation design). This meets the “monitor and enforce” requirement.

Why the other options don’t meet requirements as well:

B is manual, doesn’t scale well, and increases operational risk (key management, human error). It’s not “automated monitoring and enforcement.”

C (replacing instances with new AMIs) can be part of an immutable infrastructure strategy, but by itself it does not provide compliance monitoring across the current fleet, and scaling policies based on CloudWatch metrics are unrelated to patch compliance. Also, patch cadence would depend on AMI pipelines and instance rotation rather than direct compliance enforcement.

D is operationally heavy and mismatched: CloudTrail records API activity; it does not natively provide “patch compliance” status for instance OS packages. Recreating instances via CloudFormation for every patch is not an efficient or standard enforcement mechanism for patch compliance.

 The correct solution is to create a new assertion safety rule in Route 53 ARC and apply it to the two routing controls. An assertion safety rule is a type of safety rule that ensures that a minimum number of routing controls are always enabled. The ATLEAST type of assertion safety rule specifies the minimum number of routing controls that must be enabled for the rule to evaluate as healthy. By setting the threshold to 1, the rule ensures that at least one routing control is always turned on. This prevents the scenario where both routing controls are accidentally turned off and the application becomes unavailable in both Regions.

The other solutions are incorrect because they do not use safety rules to prevent both routing controls from being turned off. A gating safety rule is a type of safety rule that prevents routing control state changes that violate the rule logic. The OR type of gating safety rule specifies that one or more routing controls must be enabled for the rule to evaluate as healthy. However, this rule does not prevent a user from turning off both routing controls manually. A resource set is a collection of resources that are tested for readiness by Route 53 ARC. A readiness check is a test that verifies that all the resources in a resource set are operational. However, these concepts are not related to routing control states or safety rules. Therefore, creating a new resource set and a new readiness check will not ensure that at least one routing control is turned on at all times. References:

Routing control in Amazon Route 53 Application Recovery Controller

Viewing and updating routing control states in Route 53 ARC

Creating a control panel in Route 53 ARC

Creating safety rules in Route 53 ARC

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatch/latest/logs/SubscriptionFilters.html