Scenario:

The IT department wants to prevent direct communication between wireless stations.

There is one SSID configured in bridge mode (all clients on the same SSID/VLAN, directly bridging to the wired network).

Correct Action:

Block intra-SSID traffic (sometimes called “client isolation” or “intra-SSID privacy”).

This feature prevents wireless clients connected to the same SSID from communicating directly with each other at Layer 2.

Each station can reach the network but cannot reach other wireless clients on the same SSID.

This is the industry-standard method to achieve the stated security goal in a wireless environment, especially in bridge mode.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

A. Create unique SSIDs for each FortiAP device

Impractical and unnecessary for user isolation; users on the same SSID but different APs can still be isolated with intra-SSID blocking.

B. Add an upstream layer 3 device on each FortiAP device

Overkill and not required; this does not directly solve intra-SSID traffic.

D. Drop all local traffic in the wireless network

Too broad; you only want to prevent client-to-client communication, not all local traffic (such as traffic to the gateway).

Summary:

Block intra-SSID traffic is the intended and correct configuration to prevent wireless stations from communicating directly while sharing the same SSID in bridge mode.

The logs show repeated client-association-failure events followed by RADIUS authentication failure messages for client

This means the station successfully associated at Layer 2 but failed at the RADIUS authentication step (802.1X/EAP), typically due to invalid credentials or a misconfiguration on the RADIUS server.

Eventually, the log shows a successful authentication, indicating the credentials or RADIUS issue was resolved on a later attempt.

For advanced wireless troubleshooting:

Capturing air traffic (B): This means performing a wireless packet capture (sniffing), usually via the FortiAP's diagnostic tools (e.g., cw_diag sniff), to see low-level association/authentication issues, interference, or protocol errors.

Reviewing event logs (C): Check event logs on the FortiGate and FortiAP to find authentication failures, disconnections, roaming events, or system messages specific to the wireless station.

A (creating/assigning a new profile) is not typically an advanced troubleshooting step; it's more of a configuration or workaround.

D (collecting power management info) is rarely required except for specific power-saving issues, and is not a primary advanced troubleshooting step.

Debug Output Review:

The logs show repeated attempts to connect, with multiple msg: WPA ENTERPRISE TRANSITION and WPA NON-ENTERPRISE TRANSITION events.

There are repeated authentication frame exchanges, but several entries show failure messages, including incomplete handshake and RADIUS/authentication failures.

The client is unable to complete the full authentication process—typical indicators of incorrect credentials (failed RADIUS authentication) and failure in the WPA handshake process.

Unsuccessful association—No; the client does associate but fails at authentication/handshake.

C. Client denied after many attempts—No evidence the client itself is denying; it’s failing at the network’s authentication step.

The scenario involves employees connecting via remote FortiAP (FAP) devices, with a requirement to enforce corporate security policies for all wireless stations at branch/remote sites.

Teleworker topology (also called remote AP, or split-tunnel mode) is designed exactly for this:

FortiAP at remote sites connects to the main office FortiGate via a secure tunnel (CAPWAP over VPN or DTLS).

Traffic destined for corporate resources is tunneled back to the main office for full security inspection and policy enforcement.

Local internet-bound traffic can be split off locally (split-tunnel) or tunneled back as well (full-tunnel), based on policy.

This ensures all employee wireless sessions accessing corporate resources are subject to central security policies, without requiring local IT staff.

Option A (VPN tunnels) is part of the teleworker topology but doesn't by itself ensure wireless security enforcement or policy application for wireless stations—teleworker/split-tunnel is more precise.

Option B is impractical and unnecessary.

Option C moves resources to the cloud, but this does not ensure security enforcement for wireless clients over remote links.

Summary: Teleworker topology on FortiAP allows secure, policy-enforced connectivity from remote sites back to HQ for all wireless stations.

Control traffic (CAPWAP control) is crucial for AP configuration, updates, monitoring, and management between FortiAP and FortiGate.

Data traffic carries user/client data, but management/configuration relies on control traffic.